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A B S T R A C T   
During the COVID-19 pandemic, several countries asked their domestic firms to produce various medical 
equipment. Many firms promised to do so, including redesigns of existing ventilators or designing new ones. 
Despite these firms’ enthusiasm, however, many of their attempts at being resourceful- through deploying their 
resources in activities beyond their current use- were unsuccessful. Our study attempts to explain why the success 
of these efforts varied. We integrate concepts of resourcefulness, managerial cognition, and product architecture 
to develop a typology of resourcing approaches, using a firm’s characteristics and resources, its interpretative 
frames, and the technical and regulatory characteristics of the product being resourced for as boundary condi-
tions. We illustrate our theorizing through case studies on the manufacturing of face shields, hand sanitiser, face 
masks, and medical ventilators. Our study provides important implications for firms attempting to deploy their 
resources in new contexts.   
"Eric Humphreys began building a DIY breathing machine. “I literally 
used Christmas parts,” he says. But he and his boss, Manu Sawkar, the 
founder of Standard Transmission, also realised that this “DIY MacGyver 
creation,” as Sawkar puts it, wasn’t even vaguely ready for prime time. 
Real ventilators require considerable testing for reliability. They have to 
monitor patients and set off alarms if too much or too little air is going to 
the lungs. They have sophisticated algorithms to regulate flow depending 
on how well the patient is inhaling. Even if Standard Transmission did 
create something usable, Sawkar says, it would never be able to manu-
facture enough units to interest the city. So Humphreys’s creation will go 
no farther than a well-meaning gesture." (Levy, 2020) 
1. Introduction 
As COVID-19 became increasingly widespread, governments world-
wide realised their healthcare systems risked being overwhelmed. Most 
countries lacked adequate hospital capacity, ICU units, ventilators, and 
personal protective equipment (PPE). In the UK, for example, early es-
timates suggested that the NHS would be short of 20,000 ventilators 
(Davies & Rankin, 2020). In response, several governments called on 
private-sector firms to help produce PPE and ventilators.1 Many orga-
nisations, including LVMH, Airbus, Dyson, GM, and Ford, offered to 
deploy their resources, some individually and others jointly, to produce 
the needed items, including hand sanitiser, face shields or simple fabric 
face masks, medical-grade face masks,2 and ventilators. These efforts 
were supported by individuals and organisations sharing relevant in-
formation, designs, and design blueprints (Chesbrough, 2020; Crick & 
Crick, 2020) and by relaxing some requirements and rules about pro-
ducing these goods. Many attempts at being resourceful- through 
deploying resources in activities beyond their current use- were, how-
ever, unsuccessful or deficient: some products were of unacceptable 
quality, could not be produced at scale, had limited clinical effectiveness 
(e.g., only short emergency use), or failed to secure regulatory clear-
ance.3 It is crucial that we understand why some initiatives succeeded while 
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others failed. 
We address these questions by integrating the concepts of resource-
fulness and resourcing (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Korsgaard, Anderson, & 
Gaddefors, 2016; Sonenshein, 2015) with literature on innovation types 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990; (McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Tushman, 
Smith, Wood, Westerman, & O’Reilly, 2010). Resourcefulness denotes 
an ability to redeploy existing resources in novel ways to address an 
issue or create a new opportunity (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Korsgaard 
et al., 2016; Sonenshein, 2014). It explains how relationships among 
existing objects (or capabilities) that are redeployed, interpretive 
frames, and environmental limitations influence success. But its 
boundary conditions are not well understood (Williams et al., 2019). 
The innovation literature suggests product complexity is one boundary 
condition: for product development to succeed, product characteristics 
such as architecture (Henderson & Clark, 1990), number of components, 
and regulatory specifications (De Toni et al., 1998; Hobday, 1998) 
require different knowledge types and actions (Henderson & Clark, 
1990). Therefore, we argue that the success of firms’ attempts to apply 
their resources and capabilities (Sonenshein, 2014) during the pandemic 
depended on the suitability of their resourcing approaches, the inter-
pretative frames used to enact their resources, the characteristics of the 
product resourced (Weiss, Hoegl, & Gibbert, 2013), and, in some cases, 
relevant institutional support or governmental intervention (Hung, 
2002). We start by proposing a theoretical framework that proposes 
successful resourcing is based on the relations among three dimensions: 1) 
objects- which are tangible and intangible assets that a firm owns or can 
access; 2) interpretative frames- which are constituted by firm’s 
knowledge and provide the frames through which alternative uses of 
objects can be envisioned; and 3) product architecture- which refers to 
the characteristics of the product for which resourcing is directed. Based 
on this framework, we propose a typology of resourcing approaches that 
focuses on the relations among these dimensions. We also argue that 
when resource redeployment is too difficult for one firm because of a 
product’s architecture, coordination among firms is necessary. We 
illustrate our framework by analysing case studies of recent resourcing 
initiatives for face shields, hand sanitiser, medical face masks, and 
medical ventilators. We selected these categories to reflect the impli-
cations of increasing architectural complexity. 
Our paper makes several theoretical and practical contributions. 
First, we contribute to the strategy literature by integrating the 
resourcefulness and resourcing theory with the literature on innovation 
types. Our framework proposes boundary conditions for the resource-
fulness concept by suggesting how different resourcing approaches and 
actions are more appropriate in certain contexts. Second, our findings 
suggest that resourcefulness for architecturally complex product cate-
gories might require coordination by policy makers and collaborative 
innovation. Practically, our proposed framework can help managers 
who must assess a priori how feasible their innovation initiatives are. 
This framework can help prevent firms from pursuing unrealistic or 
unnecessary goals. For example, Dyson spent around £20 million to 
develop a ventilator that the UK government rejected. Our findings also 
offer useful advice for practitioners who must mobilise and manage 
industrial collaboration. Thus, our paper augments the current discourse 
in industrial marketing management on how resources can be re- 
deployed, shared, or combined (Chesbrough, 2020; Crick & Crick, 
2020) and can thus reshape or open new market opportunities (Möller, 
Nenonen, & Storbacka, 2020). It also adds a perspective on managing 
through crisis (Pedersen et al., 2020). Finally, we see the paper as 
suitable for teaching strategic innovation management. 
In this paper, we first briefly review the resourcefulness and 
resourcing perspective and the innovation types literature, and we use 
these concepts to present our tripartite integrative framework. We then 
illustrate our theorizing through three case vignettes. Finally, we discuss 
our findings and develop theoretical and practical implications. 
2. Resourcing theory: Differentiating between “objects” and 
“resources in use” 
The concept of resourcefulness is central in the entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and strategy literatures (Clough, Fang, Vissa, & Wu, 2019; 
Deken, Berends, Gemser, & Lauche, 2018; Feldman & Worline, 2011; 
Senyard et al., 2014; Wiedner, Barrett, & Oborn, 2017). Firms exhibit 
varying levels of resourcefulness- which we define as a firm’s ability to 
bring, create, combine, and/or deploy existing or new resources to seize 
and respond to opportunities (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Korsgaard et al., 
2016; Sonenshein, 2014). Resources have a “multitude of potential uses” 
(Korsgaard et al., 2016: 187) that are limited by managers’ imaginations 
and their interpretative frames (Penrose, 1959). This concept applies 
both to resource-constrained firms that must make do with what they 
got through bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Welter et al., 2016) and to 
resource-rich firms that envision better alternative uses of their re-
sources (Sonenshein, 2014). 
Unlike early accounts of the resource-based view (RBV), which 
focused on resources’ innate qualities as determinants of firm’s perfor-
mance, the resourcing perspective shifts the attention to the process 
through which “resources gain their strategic value” (Deken et al., 2018: 
1923). Early RBV perspectives (Barney, 1991; Barney, Ketchen Jr, & 
Wright, 2011) examined how the innate qualities of physical, human, 
and organisational assets (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) – or, as referred to 
in resourcing perspective ‘objects’ - can enable a firm to realise its 
strategy. This perspective does not, however, explain how assets become 
valuable (Schneider, Bullinger, & Brandl, 2020) or what the boundary 
conditions of an object being a valuable resource are. To explain this 
process, the resourcing perspective examines how practitioners enact 
assets in practice. It argues that assets become resources only when 
“organizational members take up and use assets as they pursue activities 
in line with what they wish to make happen in the world” (Feldman & 
Worline, 2011: 630). 
Resourcing theory distinguishes between an “object”, which can be a 
tangible or an intangible asset and a “resource”, which is an object that 
has already been acted on to offer value (Feldman & Worline, 2011). In 
this perspective, an object is defined broadly and can include various 
forms of knowledge and relational ties like a business ecosystem or 
supply chain relationships. Such knowledge or ties become resources 
only when they are deployed to create value, and their potential to 
become resources is shaped by actors’ interpretative frames of how they 
can be used. That is, “the designation of resource is not just about the 
innate qualities of a material or nonmaterial asset, but about the nature 
of the relationship between the asset and what it helps to create” 
(Feldman & Worline, 2011: 631). As Feldman and Worline (2011) argue, 
breadcrumbs, as an object, becomes a resource when used to enact the 
meatball framework. In contrast, although pellets of metal could be used 
to enlarge meatballs, this would be inconsistent with the framework of 
meatballs as being edible. Similarly, resourceful enacting of meatballs 
with horse meat was deemed as beyond social and legal frameworks 
(Higgins & Castle, 2013). Thus, the limits to resourcefulness are dictated 
by shared interpretative frames, which reflect physical, legal, and social 
rules. 
Nonetheless, we still know little about the boundary conditions of 
successful resourcing. What roles are played by interpretative frames 
and the characteristics of the product that is being resourced for? For 
example, why could some firms successfully redeploy their resources in 
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the effort to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, while others failed? 
2.1. Interpretative frames 
Recently, strategy scholars have suggested that managerial cognition 
and mental models are the micro-foundations of dynamic capabilities 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Felin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). This shift recognizes that 
managers develop and deploy organisational resources and capabilities 
while relying on mental models, which are “simplified representations 
of the world in order to process information (Simon, 1955)” (Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000: 1148). Those interpretative frames (sometimes referred 
to as schema, schemata, or cognitive frames)4 therefore shape managers’ 
cognition by i) focusing their attention on certain dimensions of the 
environment (Kaplan, 2008) and ii) providing them with assumptions 
about how the world works (Weick, 1995). 
While interpretive frames can facilitate decision-making by 
leveraging previous experience, they can also lead to competency traps, 
in which individuals become strongly committed to a certain frame that 
keeps them from considering alternative interpretations and leads to 
sensemaking failures (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Weick, 1995). Over-
reliance on pre-existing frames can be problematic during unprece-
dented circumstances “that require inferential flexibility and alternative 
conceptualizations” (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014: 190). As Benner and 
Tripsas (2012) argue, such rigidity can occur when individuals analog-
ically extend frames from their existing industry to an emerging one. 
Although analogical reasoning can be an effective way to transfer a 
solution across contexts, its success depends on how accurately actors 
conceptualise the differences between their base domain and the new 
target domain (Gentner, 1983). For similar contexts, actors with prior 
knowledge in these domains are more likely to use analogical reasoning 
successfully and effectively redeploy capabilities in new contexts 
(Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Mastrogiorgio & Gilsing, 2016). 
Nonetheless, actors can overemphasize superficial similarities between 
contexts while ignoring critical differences (Cornelissen & Werner, 
2014; Lovallo, Clarke, & Camerer, 2012), including regulatory or tech-
nical aspects of the product that are obscured by the apparent similar-
ities between contexts. For instance, food companies that attempted to 
enter nutraceutical markets and pharmaceutical companies that 
attempted to enter food markets failed for this reason (Siedlok, Smart, & 
Gupta, 2010). As we argue below, the interpretation of a product is also 
affected by its architecture and the regulatory roles that govern its 
design specifications. 
2.2. Product architecture: What is being resourced? 
A product architecture consists of the 1) the arrangement of its 
functional elements, which denote what the product does; 2) the map-
ping of functional elements to physical components, or which compo-
nent accomplishes what function(s); and 3) the interfaces among the 
physical components (Ulrich, 1995). Ulrich (1995) distinguished be-
tween integral and modular product architectures, which exhibit 
differing levels of interdependence among components and interfaces. 
Modular architectures exhibit a one-to-one mapping between the 
product’s physical components and its functional elements and a system 
of decoupled interfaces (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Ulrich, 1995). 
Components in modular architectures can be easily changed and pro-
duced by different firms (Sanchez, 2008). This characteristic increases 
flexibility, makes it easier to upgrade components, and enables firms to 
offer a variety of products (Sanchez, 2008). In contrast, integral 
architectures involve a “complex mapping between physical compo-
nents and functional elements and coupled interfaces between compo-
nents” (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001: 182). The high interdependence 
among components and the tightly coupled nature of interfaces mean 
that a change in one component has cascading effects on the product 
architecture (Burton, Nyuur, Amankwah-Amoah, Sarpong, & O’Regan, 
2020). 
As the interdependence and interactions among a product’s physical 
components increase (Mastrogiorgio & Gilsing, 2016), product 
complexity usually follows. Integral product architectures are a hall-
mark of high-end products (e.g., iPhone, Hard Disk Drives) and often 
rely on integrated supply chain architectures, with strong cross- 
company links that can create high entry barriers and limit the adap-
tive fit of a product or technology (Hung, 2002). This tight coupling 
limits the possibility of using alternative objects as subcomponents. As 
Dew, Sarasvathy, and Venkataraman (2004) argue, exaptation is more 
likely to take place in highly decomposable systems because the low 
interdependence among components allows actors to envision the use of 
different objects in the product design. Relatively high levels of 
decomposability usually lead to more expansive design options 
(Andriani & Carignani, 2014; Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Mastrogiorgio & 
Gilsing, 2016). 
This tendency is relevant to our study, where some components of 
medical products are in short supply because of the pandemic. Some 
non-specialised firms attempted to make up for this shortfall by 
attempting to use their objects as substitutes. While this strategy might 
work in simple products like face shields, it is more likely to fail for 
complex products with high interdependence among subparts. It is also 
less likely to work for medical equipment, which is highly regulated with 
detailed specifications to ensure product quality and patient safety. 
Because firms need to obtain regulatory approval for their products, 
product architectures stabilise and relatively strict design rules emerge 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). These rules may facilitate technical under-
standing among players in the industry, but they can impede the “ability 
to fundamentally (re-)define and develop architectural innovations, 
since the considered problem-definition and solving space will be con-
strained by the mere presence of design rules” (Hofman, Halman, & Van 
Looy, 2016: 1437). Resourcing therefore requires some fuzziness in rules 
to provide actors with the necessary level of guidance while also 
allowing them a wider space of possibilities.5 This fuzziness can be 
exploited by entrepreneurs who ignore established assumptions about 
the meaning of the technology or artefact, redeploying those in new 
contexts or new configurations (Gilbert-Saad, Siedlok, & McNaughton, 
2018; Verganti & Öberg, 2013). Governments and regulatory agencies 
can be important in such instances because they can change design 
specifications to incentivise firms to resource for certain products. For 
example, to mobilise the private sector to produce ventilators, which can 
temporarily stabilise patients, the UK government introduced guidance 
in March 2020 on the minimal acceptable specifications for ventilators. 
To summarize, we argue that the success of firms’ attempts to be 
resourceful by redeploying their objects in novel ways depends on the 
interrelations among three dimensions: 1) objects- which refer to the 
tangible and intangible assets that a company owns or can access; 2) 
interpretative frames- which provide a framework for how objects can 
be used differently; and 3) product architecture- which refers to the 
technical and regulatory characteristics of the product that is being 
resourced for (see Fig. 1). 
Firms might possess tangible assets such as equipment and produc-
tion capacity or intangible assets such as specialised technical knowl-
edge and well-established relationships within, or the knowledge 
required to coordinate, complex supply chains. Thus, we regard tacit 
knowledge as an object in this sense. These objects need to be enacted 
through interpretative frames, which guide actors about how to use 4 We use the term ‘interpretative frames’ across the paper as a mean to 
simplify the argument and avoid lengthy deliberation on the related concepts of 
mental models, cognitive representations, mental schemata etc. (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013) 5 For simplicity, we refer to this set of rules as institutional fuzziness. 
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these objects in new contexts. Successful transfer of objects to new 
contexts will therefore depend on the validity of the frames used to map 
the similarities between the base and target domain. The usefulness of 
these frames also depends on the technical and regulatory characteris-
tics of the product that is being resourced for. When the product is 
simple and the target domain shares some similarities with the firm’s 
base domain, managers might be able to analogically extend their 
frames and successfully redeploy their resources. However, analogical 
transfer in complex and uncertain situations is difficult (Gary, Wood, & 
Pillinger, 2012). In product categories with highly complex architecture, 
extending pre-existing frames to new contexts might be problematic; 
firms might overemphasize similarities and underestimate the 
complexity of the product (Schwenk, 1984) and hence fail to success-
fully redeploy their objects. In such situations, decision-makers might 
benefit from being more reflexive about the potential limits of their 
frames in new contexts (Gary et al., 2012; Hibbert, Siedlok, & Beech, 
2016). Rather than going with “gut feelings”, convergent thinking and 
involvement from a wider range of stakeholders might be required 
(Gilbert-Saad et al., 2018) to augment knowledge about the new 
context. This, in turn, might require coordination or prior experience of 
working with partners across knowledge domains (Siedlok, Hibbert, & 
Sillince, 2015). As shown in Fig. 1, this resourcing process is embedded 
in an institutional context that shapes the socially accepted meaning of 
objects and the scope for extending interpretative frames across do-
mains. Industry regulations and product specifications can also enable 
or restrict the scope for resourcing products. For example, by altering 
regulations or norms like the approval process and requirements for 
medical devices, changes in the institutional context can expand or 
narrow how an object is perceived and can be deployed. 
We argue that the success of firms’ initiatives during the pandemic 
reflects the interrelations among objects, interpretative frames, product 
architecture, and the institutional context in which they are embedded. 
Differently configured initiatives may require different resourcing 
approaches. We next present our research methods and illustrate our 
theorizing through several vignettes of different product categories. 
3. Methodology 
We aim to develop a theoretical explanation of successful resource 
deployment in new contexts through abductive reasoning, in which our 
theoretical framework is modified and refined by confronting it with the 
empirical world (Andersen & Kragh, 2010; Dubois & Gibbert, 2010). 
Case study approaches are particularly suitable for studying complex 
industrial marketing phenomena (Easton, 2010) such as resource rede-
ployment in a naturalistic setting, where the boundaries between the 
context and phenomena are blurred (Dubois & Gibbert, 2010; Stake, 
1995). As such, a multiple case study approach was deemed suitable due 
to its ability to build, extend, and refine theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Graebner, Martin, & Roundy, 2012) and “to capture relevant features of 
a case through a particular framework” (Dubois & Gibbert, 2010: 131). 
The use of case studies therefore has an illustrative function (Graebner 
et al., 2012), which allows researchers to argue the validity of their 
theoretical propositions through real-life examples (see Finch & Geiger, 
2011). Case studies also allow us to capture the similarities and differ-
ences in resourcing strategies across initiatives in different product 
categories (Elsahn, Callagher, Husted, Korber, & Siedlok, 2020) to assess 
how and why some organisations successfully deployed their resources in 
new contexts, while others failed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lindgreen et al., 
2010). 
3.1. Case selection 
Our case selection was theoretical (Eisenhardt, 1989) and emergent. 
As Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki (2011: 173) argue, “the definition of the 
unit of analysis is the fundamental answer to the question ‘what to 
select’”. Our unit of analysis is the initiative undertaken by an 
Fig. 1. Theoretical framework for resourcing strategy.  
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organisation or a group of organisations to produce medical products. 
The case selection was iterative; we adjusted constantly among data 
collection, analysis, and case selection (Lingens, Miehé, & Gassmann, 
2020). We began by focusing on specific firms, but later extended our 
focus to include other organisations and consortia. As our research 
progressed, we realised the characteristics of the product being 
resourced for helped shape the organisations’ resourcing strategies. 
Thus, we decided to focus on initiatives across different product cate-
gories characterised by different levels of complexity and fuzziness. We 
initially considered a broad selection of product categories, including 
cloth face masks; track & trace systems, and other categories of PPE, but 
we decided to focus on initiatives across four product categories: face 
shields, hand sanitiser; medical face masks, and medical ventilators. 
These categories provide enough variance for the analysis. Fig. 2 illus-
trates the product categories that we sampled the initiatives from. 
Within these categories, we sampled multiple initiatives that differed 
to detect variance across the initiatives. For example, we included ini-
tiatives that involved organisations working individually or collabora-
tively. Furthermore, we ensured that our sample included variation for 
both failed (e.g., abandonment, unacceptable quality or miniscule 
quantity, failing to secure necessary regulatory clearance) and success-
ful (e.g., the end result was safe, clinically effective, and could be 
manufactured in high volumes6) initiatives to avoid success bias and to 
capture different patterns across the cases (Elsahn et al., 2020). Table 1 
includes a list of the initiatives that we sampled in our study. We 
consider further what constituted success in the discussion section. 
3.2. Data collection 
Our approach is similar to previous studies which relied on second-
ary data to develop an in-depth understanding of observed phenomena 
and to illustrate theorizing (e.g., Finch & Geiger, 2011; Hung, 2002; 
Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014; Rusko, 2011). Several authors have 
argued that secondary data present an “unexploited and rich source of 
data that should be used when primary data is not available” (Ritala 
et al., 2014: 240; see Ambrosini, Bowman, & Collier, 2010; Cowton, 
1998; Harris, 2001). Secondary data can be particularly useful for 
studying events such as the pandemic because they are heavily covered 
by the press and governmental agencies and offer an abundance of 
secondary data (Kummitha, 2020). In addition, especially in the cases of 
failed initiatives, secondary sources can be a better alternative to in-
terviews that avoid access issues or retrospective rationalisation by 
managers (Cowton, 1998; Harris, 2001). To ensure the quality of our 
data, we relied on a variety of sources such as governmental reports and 
regulations on medical equipment, news articles by reputable media, 
company reports and press releases, and video interviews with managers 
and industry experts. We also focused on news articles that relied on 
interviews with company representatives and industry experts. In our 
search, we focused on the four product categories and the emerging 
approaches to resource redeployment within each product category. As 
Ritala et al., (2014) did, we provide illustrative quotes in our findings 
section to enhance the transparency of our analysis (Lindgreen, Di 
Benedetto, & Beverland, 2020) and to clearly connect data to our 
theorizing. Table 1 provides an overview of our data sources. 
3.3. Data analysis 
In analysing our data, we adopted an abductive approach, which 
involved iteration between theory and data (Dubois & Gibbert, 2010) 
whereby our theoretical framework evolved “simultaneously and inter-
actively with empirical observation” (Dubois & Gibbert, 2010: 131, 
italics in original). Specifically, we followed the “in vivo approach” 
(Andersen & Kragh, 2010), in which we took resourcing theory as a 
starting point to frame our inquiry, while continuously combining other 
theoretical perspectives and refining our theoretical framework in light 
of our engagement with the empirical material (Andersen & Kragh, 
2010). This approach to theory building involved interpolation, which 
helped us “extend and/or combine received theory with empirical 
Fig. 2. Case selection.  
6 The definition based on these three characteristics is adopted from one such 
initiative - CoVent – and is based on how one of the managers on the project 
defined a successful development of a ventilator. See https://www.med-tech-
news.com/features/working-round-the-clock-developing-a-ventilator-to-fight- 
cov/. 
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findings and other theoretical perspectives in order to build new theory” 
(Andersen & Kragh, 2010: 51). As argued by Dubois and Gibbert (2010) 
the in vivo approach is particularly suitable to multiple case study 
design as the phenomena of interest is kept constant across cases while 
the theoretical framework evolves to make sense of similarities and 
differences between cases. It is difficult to describe all the iteration be-
tween theory and data. Retrospectively, we can identify four main stages 
in our data analysis: developing an understanding of each case through 
within-case analysis, refining and modifying our theoretical framework, 
cross-case analysis (Lindgreen et al., 2020), and aggregating themes and 
developing our final theoretical framework. Our data analysis process is 
depicted in Fig. 3. 
Our inquiry started with the observation of firms attempting to 
deploy their existing objects in new contexts in the effort to fight the 
COVID-19 pandemic. By following several firms’ initiatives, we noticed 
that many of these efforts were unsuccessful. To make sense of the 
variations in success, we turned to the resourcefulness and resourcing 
literature. This perspective provided an initial frame to make sense of 
the sampled cases through within-case analysis. We wrote a vignette for 
each initiative describing the resources (objects) used, the process, ac-
tivities and overall deployment strategy, and the outcome. At this stage, 
we noticed that the characteristics of the product that was being 
resourced for and the actors’ cognition and perception of the opportu-
nity shaped the deployment strategy, and consequently its success. 
Fig. 3. Theorizing, data collection and data analysis: an iterative and abductive process.  
Table 1 
Overview of the data sources.  
Product category Sampled Initiatives Number and type of secondary sources Total 
Face Shields Apple initiative to manufacture face shields. 
Bauer, a sport equipment manufacturer, initiative to manufacture face 
shields. 
The makers community initiative to produce face shields through 3D 
printing. 
11 articles from reputable news and 
magazines 
2 company websites 
1 industry association website 
14 
Hand sanitiser LVMH initiative to produce hand sanitisers. 
Craft distilleries and breweries initiative to produce hand sanitisers. 
11 articles from reputable news and 
magazines 
5 government/official information reports 
1 university website 
1 news bulletin video 
18 
Surgical Masks GM initiative to produce surgical masks. 
Taiwan’s face mask team consortium initiative to produce surgical 
masks. 
15 articles from reputable news and 
magazines 
1 company website 
1 industry association website 
2 government / official information 
reports 
3 news video bulletin/interviews 
22 
Ventilators Dyson’s initiative to produce ventilators. 
Tesla’s initiative to produce ventilators. 
NASA’s initiative to produce ventilators. 
“VentilatorchallengeUK” consortium initiative to manufacture 
ventilators. 
“Vermontilator” initiative to produce ventilators. 
GM and GE healthcare initiative to produce ventilators. 
Ford initiative to produce ventilators. 
Taiwan ventilator team consortium initiative to produce ventilators. 
55 articles from reputable news and 
magazines 
7 company/consortia websites 
1 industry association website 
2 government / official information 
reports 
65 
Cross-case / general sources  15 articles from reputable news and 
magazines 
15 
Total sources used in initial analysis 134 
Additional sources included during the review 
process  
34 articles from reputable news and 
magazines 
5 company/consortia websites 
3 podcasts 
3 reportage movies 
45 
Total sources  179  
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Therefore, we revisited our framework to incorporate insights from the 
cognition and product architecture literature to make sense of our ob-
servations. We developed our tripartite framework (Fig. 1), which is 
comprised of three dimensions: 1) objects- which are tangible and 
intangible assets that a firm own or can access; 2) interpretative frames- 
which are constituted by firm’s knowledge and provide the frames 
through which alternative use of objects can be envisioned; 3) product 
architecture- which refers to the characteristics of the product to which 
resourcing is directed. We then revisited our cases and recoded them 
based on these dimensions. Subsequently, we engaged in cross-case 
analysis to identify the differences and similarities between initiatives 
to develop a theoretical explanation of the variations in success. We then 
identified five approaches to resourcing, as presented in Table 2. We 
developed these inductively by analysing all our cases and data. While 
doing so, we discussed similarities and looked for emerging patterns to 
resourcing. We paid attention to clues that highlighted motivation, 
challenges, and how organisations interpreted the products in relation to 
their existing capabilities. 
Finally, we recorded new developments and news related to the four 
product categories and organisations that we focused on. Prompted by 
reviewers’ comments, we reassessed our findings against new evidence 
and indicated the outcomes from a longer time perspective. This 
ongoing engagement allowed us to develop some additional insights 
related to the impact of these efforts after the initial goals were achieved. 
We highlight these in our discussion, along with limitations and future 
research. In the next section, we present our findings for the product 
categories that we studied, followed by a cross-case analysis in the dis-
cussion section to explicate our theoretical explanations (Piekkari, Pla-
koyiannaki, & Welch, 2010) and propose our typology of resource 
redeployment. 
4. Redeployment of capabilities amid coronavirus pandemic 
In this section, we provide illustrative cases accompanied by brief 
analyses in which we assess each product category from the perspective 
of the theoretical framework we propose in Fig. 1. We analyse product 
architecture, interpretative frames, and the object of resourcing. We 
inductively derived those from the data and used the three success 
criteria (safety, efficacy, and volume) to assess whether the approach 
succeeded. We then analysed the approach, and we note its risks and 
challenges.7 
4.1. Face shields: Apple, sport equipment manufacturers and the maker 
community 
Face shields are simple products that require little technical expertise 
and are not regulated in terms of design or manufacturing process. One 
manufacturer explained why so many firms attempted to produce 
shields: “shields need not be sterile, and “they’re easiest to manufac-
ture”.8 The interpretative frame of the product is generally agreed on: a 
piece of transparent material that protects the wearer’s face from 
contamination, with relatively fuzzy design rules allowing for a range of 
design options or manufacturing approaches, without affecting perfor-
mance. In Table 3, we analyse Apple, which had never produced face 
shields, Bauer, a sport equipment manufacturer that already had a 
similar product, and the maker community that mobilised to manufac-
ture a range of equipment. 
These cases illustrate the ease of frame transfer and deployment of 
resources. For Apple, these included monetary resources, access to and 
the ability to orchestrate supply chains, and some design capabilities. 
For Bauer, the challenge was to scale production with its existing 
equipment. The drivers are also different: for Apple it was a mix of 
philanthropy and marketing strategy while for Bauer a lifeline to stay 
open during the lockdown. The community of makers was driven by 
eagerness to help. Although, in this case rigid frames caused individuals 
to deploy resources inefficiently, as shown by their fixation on 3D 
printing when manual cutting was more effective. Thus, whereas Apple 
and Bauer succeeded, some in the maker community produced only 
miniscule volumes and overengineered the production process. 
4.2. Hand sanitiser: Perfume makers and distilleries 
Two main groups of companies tried to address the shortage of 
sanitiser: cosmetics / luxury brands such as LVMH and distilleries and 
breweries, ranging from multinational to craft producers. We analyse 
these two groups in Table 4. While sanitiser is not a complex product 
(80% ethanol, distilled water, hydrogen peroxide, and glycerine) and 
the basic recipe is publicly available on the WHO’s website, its pro-
duction is often regulated and requires a range of health and safety 
certifications. For breweries, it also required additional resources and 
competencies. 
At LVMH, the production lines, skills and required materials for 
Table 2 
Main resourcing approaches.  
Resourcing 
approaches 
Characteristics of the core organisations 
It’s in our brand High-profile organisations with access to complex supply 
chains, established clout (due to high visibility brand) 
and, potentially, leveraging their established brand in 
framing the resourced product. There seems to be a 
relation to the image of the company as being innovative 
(e.g. Tesla), design driven (e.g. Apple) and generally 
being proactive in bringing novel solutions or products 
on a regular basis, often with claims of helping 
consumers (cosmetic firms). The key factor 
underpinning the strategy being existing brand image. 
We are already making it! 
Kind of… 
Organisations that possess similar capabilities or already 
produce similar products, although sometimes operating 
in completely different markets (e.g. NASA, distilleries). 
The distance between home and target knowledge bases 
is generally small, though requiring analogical reasoning 
to make the connections between the existing and 
needed product or capability. Overall, these 
organisations, except for NASA, were often motivated by 
the opportunity to remain active and not needing to halt 
operations. 
Eager helpers Organisations or individuals that were intrinsically 
motivated, even if their resources and capabilities were 
not necessarily closely linked or fitting the requirements. 
There is a visible lack of assessment of the gap or 
consideration of other options of achieving the goal (e.g., 
partnering up), which often translated to reinventing the 
wheel or developing unnecessarily complex products or 
processes (e.g. 3D printing of face shields; focusing on 
developing new ventilator designs). 
We are all in it 
TOGETHER 
Organisations or individuals approaching the task in a 
more coordinated manner, leveraging different 
capabilities and resources across the partnership and 
recognising that collaboration is the only way to achieve 
the goals. 
Not so eager helpers Organisations or individuals that were in a position (e.g. 
existing mask producers), or deemed to be in a position 
(e.g. GM, Ford) to help by scaling up their efforts (which 
could be by partnering with others) or redeploying their 
resources (e.g. GM, Boeing), but lacked the same levels of 
intrinsic motivation to help. In those cases, governments 
utilised different mechanisms to either motivate them (e. 
g., payments tied to certain weekly production quota in 
Taiwan) or to compel them to act (e.g., GM). In most 
cases, these organisations were already involved in 
production efforts and fall into one of the other 
categories.  
7 This is the part of analysis where we develop the five resourcing strategies 
proposed in Table 2.  
8 www.economist.com/united-states/2020/04/30/americas-makers-and-tink 
erers-turn-their-hands-to-ppe 
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perfume production were closely aligned with producing hand sanitiser. 
The company could thus redeploy its capabilities and achieve large-scale 
production within days, at scale and without any issues. Repurposing for 
the luxury brands also enabled them to keep their operations running. 
Many distillers and brewers needed additional support to reconfigure 
and access new supply chains, implement new processes and policies, 
and change parts of the production (e.g., different packaging). In many 
jurisdictions, government rules also needed to be relaxed to allow for 
sanitiser produced by distilleries to be used in hospitals. Finally, some 
provisions in taxation rules and permits for alcohol production were 
implemented in some jurisdictions. Overall, though, the knowledge base 
of both groups was relatively close to the target knowledge base and 
only some adjustments were needed to succeed. 
Table 3 
Resourcing for Face Shields.  
Product 
architecture 
Face shields: (1) Very low product complexity. (2) Modular / simple component architecture. (3) No regulatory specifications for the product or the production 
process1. Manufacturing, expertise in safe machine use and design needed2. 
Fuzzy design rules allow for a range of combinations, without affecting product performance. Lack of regulations allows for many simultaneous designs. 
Example player 
(s) 
Apple:It’s in our brand Bauer:We are already making it! Kind of… Maker communities:Eager helpers 
Was it 
successful? 
Safe:yes, easy to meet the criteria 
Effectiveness:yes, easy to meet the criteria 
Volume:yes, by leveraging supply chain management 
capability 
Safe:yes, easy to meet the criteria 
Effectiveness:yes, easy to meet the criteria 
Volume:yes, by leveraging existing manufacturing 
capability 
Safe:yes, easy to meet the criteria 
Effectiveness:yes, easy to meet the criteria 
Volume:no, small scale of production and often by 
adopting inefficient approaches fixated on existing 
technical capabilities 
Objects Access to production facilities and materials, both 
internal and supply chain 
Supply chain management capability 
Design capabilities 
Equipment and materials 
Knowledge of production process 
Spare capacity due to lockdown 
3D printing equipment 
DIY capabilities 




(1) Familiarity with the component and 
architecture characteristics 
(2) Base domain of much higher sophistication in 
comparison to target base 
(3) No need for analogical reasoning due to the 
simplicity of the product and the existing supply chain 
capabilities. For the design team this would be a low- 
level challenge 
(1) Perfect alignment of component with minimal 
change to architecture 
(2) Base domain required some modifications and 
learning (production process) 
(3) Bauer displayed some levels of analogical 
reasoning to expand the frames of application for 
existing product. The process was aided by media 
coverage highlighting the demand and showing the 
design 
(1) Sufficient component and architecture 
knowledge of the product 
(2) Base domain needed some modification / 
development to apply existing knowledge 
(3) Analogical reasoning was needed to match the 
available materials with the designs and production 
methods. The process was aided by knowledge sharing 




Risks / inefficiencies: none 
Approach: Apple’s position in the supply chain 
allowed it to muster the needed materials and 
production capabilities quickly and at scale. There 
was minimal challenge for the company as the 
components and the design are relatively simple. 
Additionally, Apple released detailed 
manufacturing instructions. 
Challenges: scaling up production with existing 
machinery 
Risks / inefficiencies: none 
Approach: Existing product capabilities had a 
direct application with no requirement for new 
knowledge development or changes to the 
product. Existing capabilities allowed for limited 
production. Management needed to recognise the 
analogy between two different markets (sport and 
medical grade PPE). 
Challenges: design, access to materials 
Risks / inefficiencies: fixation on 3D printing 
approaches when simpler approaches would have 
been more effective 
Approach: Sharing of knowledge through social 
media platforms ensured constant learning, 
adaptation, and access to needed components. 
Distributed work enables some scale. 
Illustrative 
quotes 
We’ve launched a company-wide effort, bringing 
together product designers, engineering, operations and 
packaging teams, and our suppliers to design, produce, 
and ship face shields for health workers.3 
Kinnaly said one of his engineers approached him last 
month with the idea. A design was created, the 
machinery adjusted and soon after production was 
underway. The company began by making about 
3000 units per week at each location and, as the work 
force grows more familiar with the process, Kinnaly 
hopes to ramp up production to 70,000 per week by 
the end of April.4 
Facebook groups such as Open Source COVID19 
Medical Supplies, which has more than 70,000 
members, have become dispatch centres, through 
which hospital workers seek volunteers to print or 
make supplies, and volunteers trade tips on what 
materials to use and where to source them, and on 
sterilisation procedures. 
After bringing in an engineering design firm, the group 
decided to change tack. Instead of 3D printing, the 
frames and straps (…) are made from elastic and 
foam that can be purchased off-the-shelf in bulk form, 
and cut down either by machine or by hand. Darley 
says such components can be made in 20 s, compared 
with several hours through 3D printing.5 
While 3D printing offers increasing promise for helping 
to solve the shortage of medical supplies during the 
pandemic, it’s not so simple to crank up for mass 
production. “3 M’s view is that 3D printing for PPE 
[personal protective equipment] does not provide the 
scale we need67  
1 www.economist.com/united-states/2020/04/30/americas-makers-and-tinkerers-turn-their-hands-to-ppe 
2 Apple statement: Manufacturing the face shields requires professional level expertise in manufacturing and design, and should only be done by professional 
engineers or machinists in a factory environment (https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211142); https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/apr/6/apple-ma 
ke-and-ship-1-million-face-shields-each-we 
3 https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/05/apple-will-produce-1-million-face-shields-per-week-for-medical-workers.html 
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4.3. Medical face masks: GM, manufacturing sector and the Taiwan’s 
face mask team 
For this category, we focused on surgical-grade face masks and N95 
masks, both of which require certification and need to meet certain 
levels of protection.9 Surgical masks are made of three or four layers of 
fabric, with a non-woven and electrically charged middle layer that is 
ultrasonically welded, cut and assembled by specialised machinery. 
Masks also need to be produced in a sterile environment. While the non- 
woven fabric determines performance and is usually produced by a 
specialised manufacturer, the assembly machinery determines the 
needed scale of production. For N95 masks, fit is also important as it 
provides necessary level of safety for working in a hospital 
environment.10 
While the complexity of the key components was somewhere be-
tween medium (protective layer) to low (rest of the components), we 
assume that the lack of knowledge about the production process posed a 
significant challenge to non-specialist firms, leading to low outputs, 
delays and a number of failed attempts.11 The usual time to set up a N95 
manufacturing line is four to six months.12 Combined with the relative 
lack of knowledge sharing, the integral architecture of the product and 
the production process suggest why there were fewer examples of 
companies attempting to address this demand, relative to the greater 
number of attempts to produce non-medical masks.13 Two interesting 
cases in this category are GM and a handful of other manufacturers and 
Taiwan’s Face Mask Team (TFMT): a consortium of government 
agencies, industry associations, tool and machinery manufacturers, face 
mask machinery manufacturers, fabric suppliers, and face mask 
manufacturers. 
There are some stark similarities and differences in the approaches 
presented in Table 5. Both approaches relied on coordination of supply 
chains and development of production facilities. The key component, 
non-woven fabric, could be resourced relatively easily by existing actors 
in the supply chain13. The production line posed higher levels of 
complexity. Consequently, the scale of production differed significantly. 
GM relied on its existing facilities and, with some repurposing, created a 
relatively manual production line that could produce up to 1.5 million 
mask per month.14 TFMT took a different approach, with production 
increasing from fewer than 2 million mask per day at the beginning of 
the pandemic to 13 million by mid-March and over 20 million by the end 
of May.15 
The Taiwanese government recognised that there was a need to (re) 
Table 4 
Resourcing for Hand Sanitiser.  
Product 
architecture 
Hand sanitizer: (1) Low product complexity. (2) Modular 
architecture based on limited number of defined components. 
(3) Some regulatory specifications for the product. Regulatory 
specifications for the production process, with specific 
competencies of staff and certified facilities for handling 
flammable substances needed. In some jurisdictions, additional 
product specifications and certifications were needed. Some 
requirements have been temporarily eased1. (4) Limited fuzziness 





producers:It’s in our brand / 
We are already making it! Kind 
of… 
Craft distilleries / 
breweries:We are already 
making it! Kind of… 
Was it 
successful? 
Safe:yes, easy to meet the 
criteria 
Effectiveness:yes, easy to 
meet the criteria 
Volume:yes, by leveraging 
existing in-house capabilities 
Safe:yes, easy to meet the 
criteria 
Effectiveness:yes, easy to meet 
the criteria 
Volume:partially, not as high 
volume as commercial 
production in dedicated facilities 
Objects Access to certified production 
facilities and raw materials 
Knowledge of production 
processes and certified 
workforce 
Supply chain access and 
coordination capability 
Spare capacity due to 
lockdown 
Access to certified production 
facilities (distilling) 




(1) Perfect alignment of 
component with minimal 
change to architecture 
knowledge 
(2) Base domain closely 
aligned with target domain; 
no learning required. 
Minimal modification to 
production lines 
(3) Minimal levels of analogical 
reasoning were needed as both 
product characteristics and 
application are very similar 
(1) Partial alignment of 
component and architecture 
knowledge (alcohol vs gel 
based) 
(2) Base domain of one 
component closely aligned 
with target domain, but 
required additional learning 
related to the end product. 
Some (substantial) 
modification to production 
process 
(3) Straightforward analogical 





Risks / inefficiencies: none 
Approach: Existing product 
capabilities had a direct 
application with no 
requirement for new 
knowledge development. 
Large-scale production 
capabilities and need for 
minimal process and 
equipment adjustments. 
Hand sanitiser is often within 
the same good category 
(personal care). 
Challenges: access to 
packaging, architectural 
knowledge of the slightly 
more complex product (gel), 
and certification. 
Risks / inefficiencies: some 
production-related hazards. In 
some jurisdictions switching 
requires stopping normal 
production (taxes), which can 
cause shortages for supply in 
the future.5 
Approach: Existing component 
capabilities had a direct 
application but required 
additional knowledge 
development/acquisition. 
Production process needed 
some amendments. Supply 
chain access and capabilities 
were not always sufficient. 
Illustrative 
quotes 
Cosmetics manufacturing is 
actually a close cousin to 
pharmacy, and the factory 
equipment could be quickly 
repurposed. Sanitising gel 
requires three main ingredients 
— purified water, ethanol, 
hydrogen peroxide and 
glycerine — all of which LVMH 
We can’t make ventilators, and 
we can’t make masks, but we 
can make something useful. 
Making hand sanitizer is 
deceptively simple but inherently 
dangerous. 
We’re qualified to handle very 
flammable substances safely. 
Like all distilleries in New York, 


















14 www.gm.com/our-stories/commitment/face-masks-covid-production.html  
15 https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202005250014;https://focustaiwan.tw/s 
ociety/202009030016 
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build lost capability at the national level by increasing the number of 
production lines. As the remaining few mask machine manufacturers 
initially had no capacity or willingness16 to address the need, the gov-
ernment called for industry to help. Taiwan Machine Tool & Accessory 
Builders Association (TMBA) mobilised around 30 machine and tool 
makers from across the supply chain, which were joined by three main 
government industrial research institutes.17 Nonetheless, the companies 
realised that none of them had prior experience in developing a mask 
making machine and that there are significant differences between the 
capabilities required to handle the (soft) material and their existing 
competencies. At first, this consortium considered reverse engineering 
existing machines, but it concluded that achieving the required effi-
ciency and precision without access to tacit knowledge that the machine 
manufacturer possessed would be impossible. Additionally, the gov-
ernment introduced a range of levers (e.g., a dynamic payment bonus 
system) to motivate local manufacturers.18 It also specified that all 
future public purchases of masks would give preference to locally-made 
masks. 
The example illustrates high levels of reflexivity to recognise and 
address expertise gaps between base and target domains, rather than 
focusing on the similarities between them. As we illustrate in the next 
section, the lack of such reflexivity can be expensive. 
4.4. Ventilators 
Ventilators are highly specialised, complex equipment that need to 
adhere to stringent manufacturing, testing and regulatory standards. 
They include highly specialised parts that might be difficult to replace, 
advanced sensors, and algorithms. Misadjusted flow, pressure, or pace 
can lead to irreversible lung damage. Consequently, they require well- 
trained specialists and must be able to operate in a busy hospital 
environment.19 
Because of the close coupling between a patients’ condition and the 
equipment’s complexity, ventilators rely on integral architecture. 
Design fuzziness is limited. Simpler designs, such as AmbuBag, are often 
limited to emergency use or as a temporary solution until a fully func-
tional ventilator is available. 
Despite the complex nature of ventilators, a vast mobilisation of 
enthusiasts, university teams, and a range of organisations joined the 
efforts to produce them. These organisations included FitBit, GM, Ford, 
F1 teams, Airbus, and NASA. Some tried to “do it alone,” and others 
partnered up or formed consortia. Some decided to work with existing, 
and often approved, designs and producers, while others attempted to 
design a ventilator from scratch. In the United States, some companies 
were compelled to speed up their efforts by President Trump, who 
invoked the Defense Production Act.20 We focus our analysis on four 
distinct approaches, as illustrated in Table 6. 
From Table 6, several observations can be made. First, the “Eager 
Helpers” approached the task from their interpretative frame; they saw a 
ventilator as a simple air-moving machine or a simple mechanical de-
vice. Companies in this group focused on their existing frames and the 
similarities to the product they were trying to resource. This led them to 
underestimate the complexity and the highly integral architecture and 
led them to attempt to develop a simpler ventilator. This approach led to 
designs that often could be deployed only for emergency use. It was also 
difficult to obtain approvals for new, unproven designs. Medical 
equipment manufacturers argued that “it’s easy to say you can just 
design a ventilator but the safety isn’t just in the design”.21 
NASA, which also opted to develop a new design, approached the 
task differently. First, it relied on its prior experience of developing some 
medical devices and collaboration with the medical community. Second, 
it used reflexive analogical reasoning to focus on the expertise it lacked 
before it started on the project. It thus relied on established relationships 
with the medical engineering community and the FDA. Third, it had 
developed portable devices for medical use.22 Its VITAL design is 
tailored specifically for emergency use and has a limited life span, thus 
Table 4 (continued ) 
Product 
architecture 
Hand sanitizer: (1) Low product complexity. (2) Modular 
architecture based on limited number of defined components. 
(3) Some regulatory specifications for the product. Regulatory 
specifications for the production process, with specific 
competencies of staff and certified facilities for handling 
flammable substances needed. In some jurisdictions, additional 
product specifications and certifications were needed. Some 
requirements have been temporarily eased1. (4) Limited fuzziness 





producers:It’s in our brand / 
We are already making it! Kind 
of… 
Craft distilleries / 
breweries:We are already 
making it! Kind of… 
already had on hand. 
In addition to perfumes, the 
Dior, Givenchy and Guerlain 
factories also make liquid soaps 
and moisturising creams for the 
brands. Those products are 
similar in viscosity to hand 
sanitising gel, so LVMH could 
use its usual filling machines, 
plastic bottles and pump 
dispensers. A tall metal tank at 
the Dior factory usually used to 
distill scent could be used to mix 
the ingredients, and a machine 
for filling up soap bottles 
drafted into packaging the gel.3 
we have spark-resistant lighting, 
explosion-proof pumps, our 
electric is set at least five feet off 
the floor, and our staff is 
certified in fire protocols and 
spill response. 
Distillers needed to know how to 
make it safely, correctly and to 
make it effective – that’s a lot of 
knowledge to transfer very 
quickly.4 
The transition from alcohol 
production to hand sanitizer is 
fairly easy - we have the 













16 The chief reason is related to their prior experience of bearing the cost of 
scaling up production during SARS outbreak, only to be left with overcapacity 
and idle machines. Once the epidemic was over, due to the Government’s 
‘lowest price purchase guideline’ policy most mask purchased by hospital 
would be from China. Put differently, for firms investing in short-term capacity 
building seemed like a costly mistake to be repeated. This challenge was 
addressed by government reassurance to commit to ‘Made in Taiwan’ masks for 
government-run laboratories and hospitals after the pandemic.  
17 Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), Metal Industries Research 
Development Centre (MIRDC), Precision Machinery Research & Development 
Centre (PMC). 
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addressing the need only partially. 
The third distinct approach relied on a consortium of companies, 
often including a ventilator manufacturer or access to an approved 
design and licence. These consortia focused on leveraging the range of 
capabilities across the partnership. For example, Siare’s partnership 
with Ferrari and Fiat Chrysler had the latter two focus on supplying one 
part. In other cases, established manufacturers such as GM were tasked 
with developing large-scale production systems, but relied heavily on 
the know-how of the experienced ventilator manufacturers. Some of 
these companies acknowledged the importance of tacit production 
knowledge and relied on augmented reality or sent their engineering 
teams to observe, film, and photograph the production processes.23 As 
one manufacturer pointed out, it is far more efficient to expand pro-
duction when the know-how and approval are already available.24 
Those partnerships relied on complementary expertise and deployed 
their objects where they could add the most value. In those partnerships, 
automakers played a contractor role to medical device manufacturers, 
which held the required licence (certificate) and were thus responsible 
for safety. Many consortia focused on understanding their complemen-
tary capabilities and on mapping and accessing missing competencies. 
As explained by a Ford executive, “our value-add was to apply high- 
volume manufacturing expertise that you see uniquely in the auto in-
dustry. We found quite a few places where you could change a process to 
improve cycle time, and move it around, so that the throughput of the 
whole assembly process got more things out of the back end”.25 
The fourth approach also relied on a consortium of companies, but 
with governments coordinating effort and the lack of an established 
local medical equipment manufacturer. Based on the successful mobi-
lisation of face mask manufacturing and prior experience of technology 
acquisition and dissemination (Hung, 2002), the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan coordinated efforts with the indus-
trial community to redevelop and build ventilators based on an 
approved prototype that was released earlier under a special “permissive 
licence” by a prominent ventilator manufacturer (Medtronic). This 
approach relied on the realisation that the community possessed strong 
component-level expertise, but lacked architectural understanding of 
the product. The partnership relied on ITRI’s R&D capabilities and its 
medical field research (e.g., biotechnology) to provide testing capabil-
ities. It can be assumed that ITRI will pass the licence and know-how to a 
private company (c.f. Hung, 2002), with the goal of seeding a new 
industry.26 
5. Discussion and implications 
When the pandemic began, many companies attempted to repurpose 
their resources and capabilities to provide needed products. These ef-
forts suggest that resources can be used in various ways, reflecting how 
individuals enact them through interpretative frames (Feldman & 
Worline, 2011; Penrose, 1959; Sonenshein, 2014). The resourcefulness 
literature has proposed multiple strategies for using resources. These 
include bricolage as a way to make do with what you got (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005), creative use of resourcing through sensemaking (Ganz, 
2000; Sarasvathy, 2001), envisioning different applications of objects 
(Sonenshein, 2014), and deploying and recombining resources through 
collaboration and open innovation (Deken et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
experimentation with different frames and practices can lead to new 
ways of conceptualising how objects can be used (Feldman & Worline, 
2011; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018). Yet we have little un-
derstanding of the boundary conditions for resourcefulness and the 
conditions under which different resourcing strategies can be effective. 
We contribute to this discussion by proposing that the success of 
different resourcing initiatives reflected the interrelations among the 
objects owned or accessed by firms, the interpretative frames used to 
deploy those objects in new contexts, and the architecture and institu-
tional rules of the product resourced. As our findings indicate, the 
different resourcing approaches summarized in Table 2 can lead to 
different outcomes depending on the interrelations among the di-
mensions in our framework. 
Appreciating these distinctions can help managers understand the 
usefulness of each approach for different product categories. Indeed, 
failure often occurs when managers underestimate the complexities of 
product architecture and the differences between the base and target 
knowledge domains. When the target product is less complex and/or has 
a modular architecture, as face shields and hand sanitiser do, it is easier 
for firms that operate in relatively similar source domains or that possess 
relevant capabilities to redeploy their capabilities in the new context 
(Mastrogiorgio & Gilsing, 2016). Low product complexity means design 
specifications are fuzzy and thus allows a firm to experiment more and 
extend analogical interpretative frames across contexts (Sonenshein, 
2014). As product complexity increases and the relations between sub-
components become more integral, however, product specifications 
become more defined and there is less room for experimentation (San-
chez, 2008; Ulrich, 1995). In such cases, the need for coordination in-
creases because the firm attempting to enter the new domain may lack 
knowledge about certain components. These firms can contribute their 
manufacturing capacity or supply chain capabilities to help specialist 
firms ramp up their production. Our examples also suggest that pro-
duction can be more challenging than the product design itself. Even 
when the product complexity is medium, as it is for medical face masks, 
success in achieving scale is affected by access to both the tacit dimen-
sion of assembly of production machinery and to industrial engineering 
capabilities. 
In our study, the most challenging context for resource redeployment 
involves highly complex products with integral architecture such as 
ventilators. The design and manufacturing of these products require 
tacit knowledge of the integral relations among components (Ulrich, 
1995) and of strict regulatory specifications. The scope for resource 
transfer across contexts is thus limited. In these environments, non- 
specialist firms might fail to recognise the deep structural differences 
between their home and target domain while overemphasizing surface 
similarities in some components (Gary et al., 2012). We saw several 
examples of firms that analogically extended their frames without 
considering the differences between contexts. Their efforts resulted in 
ventilators unsuitable for ICU use or designs that failed to gain regula-
tory approval.27 Thus, successful resourcing in this context entails a 
coordinated approach through a consortium where specialist firms take 
the lead and non-specialist firms focus on helping to scale up production. 
Firms using this approach seemed to realise the applicability of their 
knowledge and frames in the new context was limited and adapted their 
interpretative frames by being reflexive (Hibbert et al., 2016). They may 
have focused less on potential similarities between the home and target 
knowledge domains than they did on the differences. In the case of the 
medical masks, cooperation with specialised producers of machinery 
and masks, and a consequent access to tacit knowledge, determined the 
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coordination efforts helped TFMT, lack of such coordinated approach is 
being attributed to the chronic shortages of N95 in the US context.28 
Noteworthy, the difficulties are related to the architecture of the pro-
duction process rather than to the the specialised fabric (a key compo-
nent) as this could be relatively easily resourced for27. 
Finally, our analysis highlights the role policy makers play in sup-
porting resourcing strategies: our data suggest that such interventions 
can coordinate knowledge and interests across actors (Hung, 2002), thus 
mitigating market and IP risk and “stretching” design fuzziness by 
amending regulations. Such coordination can enhance the capabilities of 
existing firms through coopetition, which is cooperation between 
competing organisations in which resources and capabilities are shared 
with competitors to achieve shared goals (Crick & Crick, 2020) and 
potentially seed new industries. As explained by Taiwan’s Deputy 
Minister of Economic Affairs, it was better to “use communication 
instead of prohibition, and “negotiate“ with manufacturers to get good 
results”. More recently, Taiwan’s government allowed firms to export 
production machinery, opening new growth opportunities.29 Surpris-
ingly, most governments did little to coordinate the efforts among or-
ganisations and sometimes seemed to lead companies into dead ends. 
For example, after providing misleading specifications, the UK govern-
ment cancelled numerous orders.30 Similarly, an overestimate of de-
mand in the United States led to contract terminations and 
uncertainty.31 There is also evidence that uncertainty about future de-
mand will discourage companies from investing in more costly 
resourcing strategies.32 Using our Fig. 2, in which we plotted the 
different product categories on two dimensions, we can superimpose 
these dynamics, as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Successful resourcing efforts thus depend on understanding product 
architecture and complexity. As this understanding increases, firms must 
become more reflexive to enable analogical thinking (Hibbert et al., 
2016). At the same time, the need for coordination and support in-
creases, particularly from government institutions. Such support can 
include amending the legal framing and the institutional context, aiding 
collaborative knowledge sharing and development, which might require 
provisions for protecting IP, and addressing the potential impact on 
existing markets that can affect current producers. 
5.1. Theoretical and practical implications 
Our study contributes to a better understanding of which resourcing 
strategies are effective under different conditions. We begin to fill this 
gap by integrating insights from the resourcefulness literature with 
those from the product architecture literature. Our study indicates that 
when firms consider whether to redeploy their resources in new con-
texts, their managers need to be both reflexive and strategic. Accurate 
assessment of a product’s architecture and firm’s capabilities can save 
significant amount of money. Indeed, the case of ventilators illustrate 
how easy it is to focus on the component level and ignore a product’s 
architectural complexity. As this complexity increases, a firm needs to 
consider working with partners that possess complementary skills. 
Managers’ ability to reason analogically can be improved through tools 
and questions that induce reflection on the structural relations between 
different domains (Gary et al., 2012; Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thomp-
son, 2003). As such, our framework and proposed typology provide a 
simple reflective tool that practitioners can use to decide the appropriate 
resourcing strategy. 
Our study also highlights the benefits that organisations can accrue 
by undertaking these resourcing initiatives. Although the efforts are 
ongoing and not all the initiatives or their impact can be ascertained, 
existing reports and our analysis allow us to outline the short and (po-
tential) long-term effects of resourcing initiatives on relevant organisa-
tions, sectors, and economies. In the immediate and short term, in 
addition to helping in resourcing the critically needed medical products, 
the main benefits include remaining operationally active, thus avoiding 
job loses or (costly) production line closures. Furthermore, press 
coverage of the initiatives provided brand exposure, which can improve 
the firm’s image, reinforce its brand strategies, or signal particular in-
dustrial capabilities to potential partners.33 Finally, organisations that 
undertook a collaborative approach managed to expand their networks, 
which can lead to enhancing their collaborative capability (Crick & 
Crick, 2020; Hibbert & Huxham, 2005). 
In the long term, resourcing initiatives can enhance organisations’ 
innovation capability when firms work with new partners from different 
fields, thus broaden their interpretative frames34 (Chesbrough, 2020). 
Second, as a result of learning from these initiatives, firms may consider 
diversifying into new markets or product categories.35 While not all 
companies may be interested in entering those new markets,36 some 
already have begun to develop related products as part of their regular 
offering (e.g., face shields as fashion items37). Others have started to 
develop new segments of products (e.g. commemorative face masks for 
special occasions), entered into new distribution relationships or 
collaborative arrangements (e.g. a leading Taiwanese airline in collab-
oration with one of the members of the TFMT developed a new “Pas-
senger Personal Protection Kit” containing specially designed mask and 
disinfectant for long haul flights).38 As the developments we report are 
ongoing, we can only assume other implications will become visible and 
offer interesting areas for future research. 
Finally, we found that governments facilitated effective resourcing. 
First, policy makers can adjust regulatory frameworks to increase fuzz-
iness in product design. This effort can allow a broader range of actors to 
redeploy their resources. Second, policy makers can amend public pro-
curement policies to ensure future demand as a lever to align the in-
terests of the industry / key stakeholders, and thus be more willing to 
invest.39 Third, policy makers can assure firms that are wary of sharing 
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Table 5 
Resourcing for Medical Face Masks.  
Product 
architecture 
Medical Face Masks: (1) Low to medium product complexity, with medium-high complexity of production process1. (2) Integral architecture based on limited 
number of components and highly dependent on production processes, based on tacit or protected by trade secrets knowledge. (3) Regulatory specifications for 
the product in terms of filtration and sterilisation, with more demanding specifications for the use in ICU context. Higher requirements for N95. (4) Relatively high 
fuzziness in terms of design / architecture and components. Low fuzziness in production process at large scale / efficiency2 
Example player 
(s) 
GM, manufacturing sector:Eager helpers Taiwan’s Face Mask Team:We are in it TOGETHER / Not so eager helpers 
Was it 
successful? 
Safe:yes, although need to meet medical (as opposed to industrial) safety criteria 
Effectiveness:yes, as long as at the lower end (medical but not N95) face masks 
Volume:no. High volume could not be achieved due to part-manual process 
Safe:yes, capability already within the consortium 
Effectiveness:yes, capability already within the consortium 
Volume:yes, capability already within the consortium for large scale production 
Objects Production facilities / equipment 
Access to supply chain 
Knowledge of manufacturing processes 
Expertise in equipment production 
Expertise in mask production 
Coordination of knowledge and production at a national scale 
Coordination of supply chain for technically complex equipment 
Interpretative 
frames 
(1) Relatively specialised components (non-woven microfibre fabric) and 
simple architecture (3 layers of material welded together; sealed design for 
N95). Large scale manufacturing requires specialist machinery (ultrasonic 
welding, sterilisation) 
(2) Distant base domain from target domain in both component and 
manufacturing process 
(3) Medium levels of analogical reasoning to identify suitable materials (from noise 
dumping to protective mask); straightforward analogical reasoning to identify the 
manufacturing capability fit 
(1) Perfect alignment of component knowledge but significant (initially) lack 
of architectural knowledge 
(2) Base domain was relatively close to the target domain (i.e. production of 
machinery), there was specialised tacit knowledge required for efficient 
production at large scale 
(3) Analogical reasoning demanded levels of reflexivity to focus on the needed 




Challenges: understanding / meeting the regulatory requirements for higher 
grade masks; achieving scale requires specialised production lines. 
Risks / inefficiencies: mostly lowscale production; technical challenges, 
including quality requirements3, often limited to lower grade / unsuitable for 
hospital use. 
Approach: Mobilisation of suppliers to develop and deliver new, suitable 
material. Use of existing modified manufacturing processes and equipment 
for assembly. Relatively low scale production only as the existing production 
equipment is unsuitable for assembly at scale. 
Challenges: achieving high levels of efficiency (tacit knowledge dependence); IP 
issues; resolving uncertainty of future demand, coordination of multiple 
interests. 
Risks / inefficiencies: IP misappropriation; lack of involvement of key players 
(competence); overproduction and too much stock at the end of the crisis that 
can demotivate mask producers form investing in a scale up. 
Approach: Government-level coordination of knowledge sharing and additional 
levers for motivating engagement. Government purchase of the machinery and 
resolving potential IP issues. Active alignment of stakeholder interests (e.g. 
dynamically adjusting bonus systems to encourage mask makers to work 
overtime and weekends8) and securing future demand (change of public 
procurement policies). Long-term strategy to build national capabilities 
beyond the current crisis. 
Illustrative 
quotes 
GM worked with automotive suppliers to develop the three layers of fabric in the 
masks. These companies typically provide GM with sound-deadening insulation 
found in doors, headliners and trunks, but they quickly altered their production 
processes.4 
Window-shade manufacturer uses the same nonwoven polyester material used in 
medical gear, and engineers there started prototyping surgical masks and gowns 
(…) The company (…) has been producing lower-grade surgical masks. (…) We’re 
becoming quickly educated in an industry which was a bit foreign to us5 
An inspection revealed that the FFP2 masks did not protect the face properly or had 
defective filter membranes.3 
But when GM started making N95s, engineers with expertise in car interiors and air 
bags were charged with figuring out the process from scratch, the company said. 
Although they received advice from major mask makers, there were no 
groundbreaking corporate partnerships this time. The first N95s GM made were 
rejected by NIOSH. The second design didn’t correctly fit most people. Other 
potential manufacturers went through the same challenges as GM, failing tests and 
making flat-fold N95s that experts worry do not offer a tight enough seal. “If there 
was some kind of intellectual sharing, they wouldn’t be doing that,”.9 
Rapidly increasing mask production will not be easy, as Taiwan’s local mask 
industry is not very profitable and most manufacturers relocated elsewhere in the 
world more than 20 years ago. (…) Taiwan’s remaining mask production equipment 
manufacturers are very small in size with limited staff and it will take four to six 
months to build 60 lines. Overall, it is extremely a challenge for mask production 
equipment manufacturers to fulfill the government goal. 
The machine tool manufacturers input its 30–40 years of production experience to 
help the mask production equipment manufacturers to shorten their production time. 
First, they dismantle the machine, classify the machine parts, and set the standard 
SOP of the mask equipment production line assemble work flow. They then 
developed modular production lines and assigned different machine tool companies 
to assist in a different operating cell. Everyone can therefore focus on their part and 
optimize their assemble efficiency.6 
[machine manufacturers] understood that reverse engineering may not be able to 
achieve that critical 5% of secret [as] the specialty of machine tools is metal cutting, 
but the masks are different - the cloth is soft. The adjustment of the two when feeding 
is completely different expertise. Their machine can only achieve 95%, without the 
key 5% technology of the mask machine factory. The production efficiency of the 
machine may be the difference between 30,000 tablets per day and 100,000 tablets 











7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PG5bI8Z7ifc*NOTE: translation from Youtube interview. Not a direct quote. 
8 https://www.twreporter.org/a/covid-19-mask-national-team-taiwan-can-help 
9 https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/news/n-95-shortage-covid/ 
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Table 6 
Resourcing for Ventilators.  
Product 
architecture 
Ventilators: (1) High product complexity1 (2) Integral architecture (high number of specialised components, software, testing, …) (3) Overall demanding 
regulatory specifications for the product (some variation based on geography or type of ventilator) and the production process, with licence attached to a specific 
manufacturer who bears responsibility for safety of the equipment2 (4) Very limited fuzziness in terms of architecture, some limited fuzziness in terms of components.3 
Example 
player(s) 
Dyson, Tesla:Eager helpers / it’s in 
our brand 
NASA:we are already making it! 
Kind of… / it’s in our brand 
VentilatorChallengeUK; Vermontilator; 
GM*&GE Healthcare; Ford:we are in it 
TOGETHER / Not so eager helpers 




Safe:no, failed to get an approval 
Effectiveness:no, most could be 
used in very limited capacity 
Volume:not clear as most did not 
enter production 
Safe:yes, approved 
Effectiveness:limited due to 
limited lifespan and only 
emergency use 
Volume:not clear, probably 
reasonable volume that could 
match regular production, but not 
as high volume as others could 
achieve 
Safe:yes, most got approved 
Effectiveness: mixed formlimited to 
relatively high, most could be used in limited 
capacity 
Volume:yes, most could achieve reasonably 
high volume, often higher than regular 
production 
Safe:yes, approved 
Effectiveness:yes, improving proven 
design 
Volume:not clear as most did not enter 
production. Based on the assessment of 
existing manufacturing capabilities and 
supply chain in place, can likely yes 
Objects Design and production 
capabilities in the mechanical 
engineering domains (broadly) 
Access to production lines and 
skilled staff 
Supply chain management 
capabilities 
Financial resources 
Design and production 
capabilities for highly complex 
equipment 
Established relationship with 
medical equipment community 
and with local regulatory agency 
(access to expert knowledge on 
medical devices) 
Prior experience in medical 
device development (mix of tacit 
knowledge and collaborative 
capability) 
Manufacturing and industrial engineering 
capabilities 
Access to and power to orchestrate 
specialised supply chain 
Medical device manufacturing and market 
expertise 
Specific component capabilities 
Existing ventilator design 
Approved design or experience in 
obtaining approval 
Integrated circuit design and 
manufacturing capabilities 
These capabilities were distributed among 
members 
Knowledge transfer and collaborative 
product development a 
Rapid prototyping a 
Medical research and testing a 
Medical equipment components 
manufacture b 
Manufacturing capabilities b 
Software development capabilities b 
Integrated circuit design and 
manufacturing capabilities b 





(1) (Potential) familiarity with 
the component but lacking 
understanding of the architecture 
(2) Base domain significantly 
different from target domain, 
except for engineering principles 
(3) Analogical reasoning was 
clouded by focus on the mechanical 
design and the airflow aspect of a 
ventilator, at the expense of 
regulatory, safety, and continuous 
monitoring issues 
(1) Some familiarity with the 
component and architecture of 
the product and the process 
(2) Home and target base 
relatively distant, although 
overlaps exist. The gap is bridged 
by existing network relationships 
(3) Analogical reasoning 
demanded reflexivity to focus on 
the lack of expertise and engaging 
with experts outside of the 
company 
(1) Medical device partner possessing both 
the component and architectural 
knowledge, while partners often limited to 
some component knowledge only 
(2) The large gap between the domains is 
bridged through the network and 
knowledge sharing practices (e.g., 
augmented reality) 
(3) Analogical reasoning demanded high 
levels of reflexivity to focus on mapping of the 
complementarities and reaching to partners 
with needed expertise 
(1) Knowledge of the component but 
no knowledge of the architecture 
(2) Base domains distant from the 
target domain (e.g., no expertise in 
ventilator or similar medical device 
manufacturing), some overlap in 
medical components and R&D 
capabilities (e.g., prototyping, testing) 
(3) Analogical reasoning to bridge the 
missing expertise in ventilator 
development and certification from prior 
R&D experience of ITRI 
Deployment 
strategy 
Challenges: lack of medical 
devices manufacturing expertise; 
obtaining relevant certifications; 
understanding of the medical 
environment. 
Risks / inefficiencies: 
misinterpreting of the product as 
a “simple air moving machine” 
and disregarding the (stringent) 
regulations. Machines could often 
be used for only a short time as a 
bridge / emergency solution; no 
market after the pandemic34 
Approach: Lacked realistic 
assessment of technology. Often 
opting for complete re-design of 
existing products. Most work was 
undertaken in-house and relied 
on existing capabilities, forcing to 
focus on the less complex types of 
ventilators (AmbuBag) which 
could gain necessary approvals 
for emergency use. 
Challenges: leveraging the 
existing network to meet the 
demands of the unknown 
market; engaging partners to 
build a potentially competitive 
product to their market. 
Risks / inefficiencies: the machine 
produced has limited lifespan. 
Approach: Leveraging the 
existing network. Reflexive 
assessment. Engaging and 
relying on medical device 
community and relationship 
with FDA. Design required 
relaxing of some of the rules. 
Potential risk of saturating the 
market mitigated by limited 
lifespan. 
Challenges: coordinating the network to 
achieve required quality and safety; 
sharing of knowledge, potential IP issues; 
access to necessary parts that are 
unavailable. 
Risks / inefficiencies: in some cases, only 
lesser functionality machines could be 
delivered; obtaining necessary approvals; 
safety issues; saturating the future market 
or creating own competitors; sharing of 
obsolete blueprints. 
Approach: Reflexive assessment and 
reaching out for missing expertise. In most 
cases the teams started with focusing on 
the task complexity (e.g. understanding of 
how lungs and ventilator work together) 
and needed expertise. Resourcing strategy 
based on complementarity capabilities. 
Partnerships spanned from cooperative to 
collaborative approaches. 
Challenges: lack of medical devices 
manufacture expertise; access to IP / 
device designs. 
Risks / inefficiencies: settling on subpar/ 
obsolete design; obtaining 
international certifications; no local 
established producers to ‘take over’. 
Approach: R&D cost is covered by the 
government, with technology 
transferred to industry once mature; 
obtaining an IP with a plan to upgrade 
it in-house.11 Leveraging lack of local 
competition to mobilise the industry 
and seed a new industry (technological 
upgrading). Long-term strategy to 




Firms with no prior experience were 
increasingly bullish that they could 
design and build a prototype within 
weeks. 
Without the independent regulatory 
teams, most of these projects would 
have gone nowhere. (…). It’s easy to 
say you can just design a ventilator 
but the safety isn’t just in the design, 
it’s about how you make them, the 
quality management, servicing 
We specialize in spacecraft, not 
medical device manufacturing. But 
excellent engineering, rigorous 
testing and rapid prototyping are 
some of our specialties. 
Building a medical device is new. 
It goes against our culture to do 
something quickly in a domain 
where we’re not experts.8 
At first, the engineers began in the 
spirit of Apollo 13. (…) can we at 
The only group to have secured regulatory 
approval and supplied ventilators to the NHS 
in significant numbers is 
VentilatorChallengeUK, a consortium of 
manufacturers that focused on scaling up 
production of proven devices, rather than 
building new ones.10 
A lung analogue was brought in from the 
hospital for testing; a regulatory expert began 
preparing an emergency report for the Food 
and Drug Administration, which had created a 
U.S. ventilator giant Medtronic shared the 
basic design specifications of its PB 560 
portable ventilator, following which ITRI 
coordinated resources needed to produce 
a ventilator, including mechanisms, 
electronic controls, firmware, software, 
and data system integration, and it 
successfully sourced more than 500 key 
components, which demonstrates the 
outstanding flexibility and strengths of 
Taiwan’s supply chain. 
(continued on next page) 
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issues. They can also provide access to needed technology through 
enticing ground-breaking corporate partnerships and knowledge 
sharing.40 Moreover, policy makers can coordinate complex networks of 
partners to enable complementary resourcing. The examples of the 
ventilator challenge and the scaling up of mask production illustrate 
how policy makers can influence these outcomes. Finally, our analysis 
demonstrates the nested and multi-layered nature of business environ-
ments and the intrinsic interrelatedness that drive development of 
markets and business ecosystems (Möller et al., 2020). 
6. Limitations 
As with any research, this study has limitations. First, we rely solely 
on secondary data, which can be incomplete and subject to our (mis) 
interpretation. However, considering the context, this reliance can be a 
strength. Second, the story of the pandemic is still unfolding. For 
example, we defined success as an initiative that delivers safe and 
effective products at volume. Yet an initiative that failed by this criterion 
might eventually help an organisation succeed. Learning from failure 
can lead to organisational transformation and changes in managerial 
interpretative frames (Madsen & Desai, 2010). Finally, our own frames 
of reference affect our interpretations of the cases. Again, we see 
pluralism and alternative explanations as a strength rather than a limi-
tation (Elsahn et al., 2020). Going forward, our results open paths for 
further research focused on the different mechanisms to coordinate 
resourcing activities, the role of the government institutions and regu-
lations, issues related to IP or, indeed, market dynamics. 
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Table 6 (continued ) 
Product 
architecture 
Ventilators: (1) High product complexity1 (2) Integral architecture (high number of specialised components, software, testing, …) (3) Overall demanding 
regulatory specifications for the product (some variation based on geography or type of ventilator) and the production process, with licence attached to a specific 
manufacturer who bears responsibility for safety of the equipment2 (4) Very limited fuzziness in terms of architecture, some limited fuzziness in terms of components.3 
Example 
player(s) 
Dyson, Tesla:Eager helpers / it’s in 
our brand 
NASA:we are already making it! 
Kind of… / it’s in our brand 
VentilatorChallengeUK; Vermontilator; 
GM*&GE Healthcare; Ford:we are in it 
TOGETHER / Not so eager helpers 
Taiwan Ventilator Team: we are in it 
TOGETHER 
them. It’s not an innovation 
programme, it was there to meet a 
clinical need.5 
Musk responded saying the tech 
components produced at his Tesla 
and SpaceX factories were 
“sophisticated” and ventilators 
were “not difficult” in comparison. 
Tesla makes cars with sophisticated 
HVAC systems (…) Ventilators are 
not difficult, but cannot be produced 
instantly.6 
I think the idea of automotive 
manufacturers or indeed any 
manufacturer that is not well-versed 
in the production of medical devices 
somehow quickly retooling and 
making an alternative product is 
very naïve.7 
J.P.L. design a ventilator that uses 
parts scrounged from a garage, or 
from a vacuum cleaner, or a Home 
Depot? That idea lasted about six 
hours. They next considered 
developing a reference design and 
open-sourcing it for do-it- 
yourselfers. A doctor who had 
come in to consult waved them off, 
explaining that his hospital would 
only use a device that had been F. 
D.A.-approved. “He dropped a lot 
of reality on everybody about the 
level of engineering we’d have to 
do”.9 
special approval process for stopgap 
ventilators; and several local contract 
manufacturers were lined up so that the device 
could be mass-produced. For G.M., Ventec has 
created a simplified version known as the V +
Pro. G.M. flew six engineers to study the 
production process. “We took a lot of pictures 
and a lot of video,”. The VOCSN has around 
seven hundred parts; the V + Pro, around four 
hundred. By e-mailing lists of parts to around 
seventy of its “Tier 1” suppliers, G.M. was 
able to secure all of them by the following 
weekend. Suppliers had to adapt production 
lines to new specifications; they had to ask 
their own suppliers to do the same.9 
It was tough for Ford and other big industrial 
companies to pivot into making medical 
equipment. Quite apart from the (obvious) 
challenge of sterilising previously filthy 
assembly lines, it was almost impossible to find 
basic manufacturing materials when cross- 
border supply chains collapsed during 
lockdown13 
ITRI has seized upon three factors to this 
end. The first key is software: The team 
successfully interpreted the software 
program and functions of the Medtronic 
prototype. The second key is system 
components: The team actively sought out 
components from the up-, mid-, and 
downstream industrial chain, including 
microprocessors, sensors, fan motors, 
blowers, and masks, and even is 
producing some items on its own via 3D 
printing. The third key is system 
validation: To domestically produce the 
key components of the ventilator is the 
first step. Then the prototype will need to 
pass software and hardware testing, 
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development, the dynamics of interdisciplinary research collaborations, 
reflexivity and strategic management and decision-making. 
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